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Abstract. It is controversial whether ‘Christian Philosophy’ is a useful or even 
consistent notion. After providing some historical background to the problem, 
I  will distinguish and explicate two possible understandings of ‘Christian 
Philosophy’ which should be kept apart: a  ‘Thomistic’ and an ‘Augustinian’ 
one, of which the latter has garnered more attention in the recent literature. 
A sketch of the most prominent current ‘Augustinian’ position (Alvin Plantinga’s 
‘reformed epistemology’) leads to some considerations for why a  ‘Thomistic’ 
understanding of ‘Christian Philosophy’ has more to recommend it, if the term 
is regarded as useful at all.
An obvious touchstone for understanding how a religion relates to the 
idea of reasoning and giving reasons is its relation to philosophy. Now 
for various reasons not all religions have an (in any way elaborate) 
relation to philosophy, but some in fact do: there is frequent talk of 
‘Christian Philosophy’, ‘Islamic Philosophy’ and/or1 ‘muslim Philosophy’, 
‘Jewish Philosophy’, ‘buddhist Philosophy’, and so forth. on the other 
hand, such terms face constant worry and are often rejected: the very 
idea of a philosophy with some religious epithet or branding seems to 
many people philosophically unacceptable, or undesirable for religious 
reasons, or even both. In the present article I explore the prospects for 
someone who wants to preserve the term ‘Christian Philosophy’ (and 
1 I mention both terms here since the question of a difference in meaning between 
them is non-trivial. roughly, ‘muslim philosophy’ is mostly understood as philosophy 
that is/was done by muslims, whereas ‘Islamic philosophy’ is philosophy with a religious 
orientation inspired by Islam. This distinction does not correspond to my later distinction; 
but within Islamic philosophy there are discussions going on which are comparable to the 
debates between ‘Thomistic’ and ‘Augustinian’ Christian philosophy to be discussed here.
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there are, I  think, certain reasons for preserving it). Presumably, the 
results of my considerations might, mutatis mutandis, also be relevant 
for Islamic, Jewish and other philosophies. After an exposition of the 
problem in section I, I will briefly call to mind a historical debate from 
the 1920s and 30s on the notion of ‘Christian Philosophy’ (section II). 
my subsequent analysis requires a  certain methodological abstraction 
concerning religions (section III), on the background of which I  will 
in section IV expose the crucial distinction between ‘Augustinian’ and 
‘Thomistic’ Christian Philosophy, which revolves around different 
structures of philosophical reasoning. To illustrate the relevance of the 
distinction, I will in section V briefly recap what is probably the most 
prominent current ‘Augustinian’ position: Alvin Plantinga’s ‘reformed 
epistemology’, a  critical assessment of which leads to some general 
remarks about why the ‘Thomistic’ approach has, all in all, more to 
recommend it, if the notion of ‘Christian Philosophy’ is taken to be 
fruitful at all (section VI).
I. THe Problem
The worry that ‘Christian Philosophy’ might be an internally incoherent 
notion has to do with widespread semantic intuitions about ‘philosophy’. 
Although there is to my knowledge no universally accepted definition of 
philosophy, I think that many people would explicate it something like 
this (at least this is the most adequate explication I have found so far):
Philosophy is the systematic attempt to understand how everything 
hangs together based on one’s own insight. studying philosophy makes 
methodical use of the results of others’ attempts.2
some swift comments on this explication might be in order. Philosophy 
is a systematic attempt (unlike, e.g., art, which also sometimes tries to 
understand how everything hangs together); it is an attempt (i.e., it is 
more like an ongoing activity and less like a completed, available stock 
of knowledge); and its primary target is how everything hangs together, 
whereas the special sciences investigate to special kinds, aspects, sectors, 
or parts of reality. unlike religions, political or other ideologies, it hopes 
to achieve this goal by relying on the philosopher’s own insight, i.e., not 
on faith or commitment to some tradition, revelation or the like. The last 
2 otto muck, Christliche Philosophie (Kevelaer: butzon & bercker, 1964), 20, my 
translation.
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clause in the explication makes clear that philosophy does not consist 
merely in repeating philosophical statements made by others, but that 
adoptions of others’ philosophical views must have some methodical 
backing. It must be stressed that philosophy is not identical with the 
history of philosophy, even if the knowledge of its own history is more 
important for philosophy than for other scholarly disciplines.
The problem concerning ‘Christian Philosophy’ revolves, of course, 
around the clause ‘based on one’s own insight’. religions like Christianity 
usually claim that they are not accepted on thinkers’ own insight, at least 
not completely, but rather on insight emendated by something else, like 
reliance on some tradition or revelation, an enhancement of cognition 
by a supernatural addendum like insight by faith, etc. Hence, ‘Christian 
Philosophy’ seems to be a self-contradiction, and this explains some well 
known verdicts of it. martin Heidegger, for example, in his 1927 essay 
Phänomenologie und Theologie,3 criticizes the idea as a ‘wooden iron’, and 
the prominent swiss reformed theologian Karl barth holds that
... there never has actually been a  philosophia christiana, for if it was 
philosophia it was not christiana, and if it was christiana it was not 
philosophia.4
but on the other hand there seem to be good arguments which contradict 
these statements, from historical as well as systematic standpoints:
(1) Historically, certain epochs in (Western) philosophy are simply not 
understandable without considering their factual religious background 
in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic faith. It is a fact that over long centuries, 
almost everyone whom today’s history of philosophy textbooks list 
as a  philosopher was also a  theologian, and there was even no clear 
methodological distinction between philosophy and theology until the 
13th century. This distinction was only made by scholastics like Albert 
the Great and especially Thomas Aquinas.
likewise, important philosophical ideas such as ‘history’, ‘person’, 
‘free will’, ‘human rights’, ‘law of nature’, etc., have either only distant 
predecessors in Greco-roman philosophy or none at all, but they were 
evidently inspired by their Judaeo-Christian-Islamic theological roots. 
Hence, at least in certain past epochs, one could talk about a ‘Christian 
Philosophy’.
3 ‘Phänomenologie und Theologie’ (1927), in: Wegmarken (Gesamtausgabe I/9) 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann 1976), 66.
4 Karl barth, Church Dogmatics (1932, english tr. 1936), I/1, § 1, 6.
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(2) From a  rather hermeneutico-epistemological standpoint, one 
might doubt whether something like the oft-desired ‘presupposition-
free philosophy’ is really within reach. Is it really possible to completely 
distance oneself as a philosopher from any influences of the background 
tradition(s) within which one was brought up? Notably, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer in his Truth and Method (1960) claimed that it is most probably 
not possible. As a way out, Gadamer partially rehabilitated traditions from 
the common suspicion that they inevitably blindfold us. He stated that it 
is rather the philosopher’s task to get into the ‘horizon of understanding’ 
of other thinkers and thereby gain awareness of one’s own horizon which 
might otherwise remain unnoticed. The experiences of philosophers who 
had occasion to become acquainted with distant philosophical cultures 
seem to support Gadamer’s thesis (e.g., for european philosophers, 
contact with Far-eastern philosophies is usually fruitful in discovering 
typical european mindsets which do not go without saying, and vice-
versa). If this is correct, it appears that most probably every philosopher 
(consciously or not) does some kind of ‘XY-ian philosophy’ (the influences 
might be from religious, philosophical, political, or other traditions), 
without thereby disqualifying himself as a philosopher. one could hence 
conclude that a ‘Christian Philosophy’ would not per se be less legitimate 
than other XY-ian philosophies, and even that sincerity and perspicuity 
require laying bare the worldviews within which we operate.
II. THe DebATe IN THe 1920/30s
In order to find a way out of this problem, it is useful to briefly recall a very 
similar debate in the 1920s and 30s about the possibility and legitimacy 
of ‘Christian Philosophy’ which is widely forgotten today,5 but which 
5 An exception is Gregory sadler, whose extensive publications over the last years have 
brought this debate back into focus. For an overview, see his freely accessible articles: 
‘The 1930s Christian Philosophy Debates’, in Acta Philosophica, 21 (2012), 393-406, 
available at: <http://www.academia.edu/2180852/The_1930s_Christian_Philosophy_
Debates_bibliografica_Tematica> (accessed 04/04/2013), and: ‘Christian Philosophy: 
The 1930s French Debates’ (2009), in: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available 
at: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/chri1930/> (accessed 04/04/2013). The most important 
texts of the French discussion were recently republished by him in english: Gregory 
b. sadler (ed.), Reason Fulfilled by Revelation: The 1930s Christian Philosophy Debates 
in France (Washington: Catholic university of America Press, 2011). see also ralph 
mcInerny, ‘reflections on Christian Philosophy’, in linda Zagzebski (ed.), Rational 
Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology (Notre Dame: university of Notre 
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attracted much attention in those days. In a couple of writings and lectures, 
the French historian of philosophy Étienne Gilson had claimed that the 
philosophy of late antiquity and the middle ages could duly be called 
‘Christian Philosophy’, since many philosophical topics had emerged 
against the backdrop of Christian theology, and on neither a personal 
nor an institutional level could you distinguish between philosophy 
and theology in those epochs. even if the epistemological distinction 
between philosophical and theological arguments was addressed here 
and there, revelation was commonly and unproblematically seen as 
a support of reason. (It might be added that a really clear methodological 
distinction between philosophy and theology was not available before the 
mid-13th century, when it appeared in the works of Thomas Aquinas.) 
Gilson provoked a harsh reaction by the French historian of philosophy 
emile bréhier, who claimed in a 1931 conference paper entitled ‘Is there 
a Christian Philosophy?’6 that the idea of a ‘Christian Philosophy’ would 
be as absurd as ‘Christian mathematics’. The debates (which consisted 
in numerous journal articles and a  couple of meetings)7 climaxed at 
the 1933 conference of the French Thomist society at the Dominican 
convent of Juvisy-sur-orge near Paris. The texts from this conference 
were published in a volume entitled La philosophie chrétienne.8
The main result of the debates was an increasing awareness that two9 
basic conceptions of ‘Christian Philosophy’ could be distinguished, and 
that the question ‘Is there a Christian Philosophy?’ should best be treated 
on the basis of this distinction. The two types are frequently labelled as an 
‘Augustinian’ versus a ‘Thomistic’ understanding of Christian Philosophy. 
Dame Press, 1992), 256-279, for the bigger historical context the three volumes emerich 
Coreth – Georg Pfligersdorffer (eds.), Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 
19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Graz etc.: styria, 1987-1990), and for the German-speaking 
realm Heinrich m. schmidinger, ‘Die christliche Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts im 
deutschen sprachraum. eine philosophiegeschichtliche skizze’, in Salzburger Jahrbuch 
für Philosophie, 35 (1990), 105-123.
6 emile bréhier, ‘Y-a-t’il une philosophie chrétienne?’, in Revue de Métaphysique et de 
la Morale, 38 (1931), 133-162.
7 For literature on the historical details, see footnote 2 above.
8 société Thomiste (ed.), La philosophie chrétienne, Juvisy 11 septembre 1933 (Journées 
d’études de la société Thomiste 2) (Paris: Cerf, 1933). see also the english texts in sadler 
2011 (see footnote 5 above).
9 At the outset, there were more conceptions proposed than just these two. but the 
historical details are not the principal concern of this paper; see sadler 2009 and 2012 
(footnote 5 above).
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These labels are somewhat anachronistic in that neither Augustine (354-
430) nor Thomas Aquinas (1224/25-1274) explicitly elaborated on the 
notion of a  ‘Christian Philosophy’ (discussions on that issue came up 
centuries later!). but Augustine’s and Thomas’s overall approaches to 
philosophy, especially their ways of relating the deliverances of faith 
and reason, can be seen as examples for these two conceptions. As 
a methodological prerequisite for their explication (in section IV), I will 
in section III introduce an abstraction concerning religions.
III. A meTHoDoloGICAl AbsTrACTIoN: 
relIGIoNs As seTs oF ProPosITIoNs
religions are notably complex phenomena displaying many features: 
they have a social aspect, i.e., they are practiced in more or less structured 
groups with ‘experts’ and ‘functionaries’ (like priests, prophets, shamans, 
monks, etc.); they have rituals of various kinds; holy places, times, or 
objects; they usually have some moral behaviour code influencing 
private and public behaviour (think of the 10 Commandments in 
Judaism and Christianity, the Catholic social doctrine, Jewish and 
Islamic food guidelines, and various forms of taboo); some religions 
claim a history which is crucial for their self-understanding; they usually 
offer something like a world-picture answering ultimate questions (about 
where we come from and will be going to, what life is ultimately good 
for, etc.), and they have something like a theory-like, cognitive core of 
propositions. e.g., Christians on the one hand and Jews and muslims on 
the other disagree about propositions like ‘God is one and unique, but in 
him there is also some multiplicity’ versus ‘God is radically one’. The list 
of features may not be complete, and of course, various religions display 
these features in varying intensities. For example, there are religions 
which place great weight on the ritual side and do not emphasize their 
cognitive core, but the opposite weighting is also possible; the visibility 
and structure of the group may differ significantly; and likewise the 
importance of religious morals, taboo-like behaviour, etc., may vary 
between religions. Nevertheless, a minimum cognitive core seems to be 
present in any religion.10
For my present task, I will concentrate on this cognitive core: religions 
are considered as if they were sets of propositions (or sets of beliefs in 
10 I owe this idea especially to Joseph m. bochenski’s still underrated but in my view 
classical book The Logic of Religion (New York: New York university Press, 1965).
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these propositions).10 sets of propositions are the material of which 
an analytically oriented epistemological approach to religion has best 
grip. I am of course fully aware that this cognitivist approach has had an 
at least ambivalent history in the philosophy of religion; the ritual side of 
religions has especially been neglected by philosophy. let me thus stress 
that this methodological move is just an abstraction and not a reduction. 
The existence and relevance of the other facets of religion are hereby not 
denied, and I definitely do not want to advocate the reductionist error 
that religions are nothing but sets of propositions.
A  second constraint is my focus on religions which claim to have 
an access to sources of religious information beyond the deliverances 
of common human reason. The most prominent examples are the so-
called ‘revelation religions’, of which the best-known are Christianity, 
Islam, and Judaism. However, there are many more examples, such 
as mormonism or the baha’i  religion. This constraint is being made 
because the distinction between ‘Augustinian’ and ‘Thomistic’ Christian 
Philosophy has to do with the way in which the deliverances of common 
human reason and these additional sources relate.
IV. ‘AuGusTINIAN’ AND ‘THomIsTIC’ CHrIsTIAN PHIlosoPHY
bearing these methodological preliminaries in mind, let us think of 
a religious believer’s belief system as a vast set11 of propositions of which 
a  certain subset can only be known by relying on revelation (i.e., the 
‘theological beliefs’ in a  narrower sense), whereas the bigger bulk of 
his knowledge can be acquired by natural reason alone, and hence in 
principle by anyone.12 A  common example which is often mentioned 
11 A further simplification in my approach lies in the fact that the whole network of 
relations between the beliefs (psychological connections and logical support of various 
kinds) is not considered here and the beliefs are rather taken atomistically. but of 
course I do not thereby want to suggest that this atomistic picture is psychologically or 
epistemologically realistic. (I make this abstraction because considering these relations 
leads to a  whole nest of related problems which cannot be addressed here: e.g., the 
problem of the role which non-revelation-based propositions play in the support of 
revelation-based beliefs (commonly treated under the label ‘analysis fidei’) or the nature 
of conclusions from a ‘mixed’ set of (non-)revelation-based premises (which was at times 
discussed under the label ‘conclusio theologica’).)
12 Alvin Plantinga repeatedly and rightly remarked that, in philosophy and worldview-
related issues, there are hardly any important beliefs which are held by virtually everyone, 
since matters here are notoriously controversial (see, e.g. his ‘Augustinian Christian 
Philosophy’, in The Monist, 75 (1992), 293f.). This is right; but the important demarcation 
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in this context is the doctrine of the Holy Trinity: that God exists is 
(according to the classical view) a deliverance of natural reason alone, 
whereas the triune nature of God can only be known13 on the basis of 
revelation. In the following graphical model of the belief-system of an 
idealized believer, the doctrine of the Holy Trinity would be a member of 
the gray subset, and God’s existence a member of the white one: 
 
The central question, which leads to the distinction between the two forms 
of ‘Christian Philosophy’, is the following: Where in this belief system can 
philosophical reasoning start, i.e., from which subsets of propositions 
may its premises be taken, and what is ‘Christian Philosophy’ supposed 
to achieve?
IV.1. The ‘Augustinian’ Christian philosopher would provide the 
following answer: Concerning methodology, we may – as philosophers! – 
also use what we can only know from revelation. The form of question 
which is typically posed in that style of Christian philosophy is this: ‘What 
would follow for some topic XY if the Christian doctrines were true?’ That 
is, the Christian doctrine is used as a source of (at least hypothetically 
acceptable) premises for philosophy.
The task of philosophy, so understood, consists in developing and 
defending a consistent, coherent and comprehensive Christian worldview. 
From this perspective, even projects like a  ‘Christian epistemology’, 
a ‘Christian set theory’ or a ‘Christian probabilistic confirmation theory’14 
could – against bréhier’s verdict – indeed make sense, at least in principle. 
The Augustinian Christian thinker might even claim to provide some 
to be drawn here is the one between propositions which are notoriously unaccepted by 
many people (since they are revealed only) and the rest of our beliefs.
13 A disclaimer: I speak of ‘knowledge’ here and in the following passages in a non-
technical sense. I  use the word mainly for the flat-footed reason that the alternative 
wording ‘can only be believed on the basis of revelation’ would sound odd. but I do not 
intend thereby to claim anything about whether or not beliefs about theological issues 
may constitute knowledge (in any explication of this word).
14 see richard otte, ‘A Theistic Conception of Probability’, in Faith and Philosophy, 
4 (1987), 424-447.
Propositions that can only be known by relying on revelation
The whole set of propositions known
Propositions that can be known by natural reason
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explanatory surplus in these fields in comparison to secular scholars. For 
example, the notorious process/result-ambiguity concerning the word 
Zusammenfassung (‘collection’) in Cantor’s famous definition of sets (i.e., 
is this collection something already present or is it made/created by the 
cognizing mind? And if the latter, how can human minds create enough 
of them to make set theory work?) might be settled in a certain direction: 
since the eternal, infinite God’s omniscient mind knows all sets, they 
all – at least from our human perspective – exist already, and they are 
something we discover rather than create. This endorses a modest realist 
understanding of sets (from the human perspective) backed by a  sort 
of theistic constructivism.15 Another example is the notorious problem 
of how to justify the convergence in probability judgments by different 
observers within bayesian confirmation theory: is this convergence 
a  theoretical consequence or an additional (and dubious) synthetic 
a priori assumption? Christian bayesian conformation theorists of the 
Augustinian temperament might provide a solution: since we are ‘created 
in God’s image’ according to Christian anthropology, God will also have 
enabled us to participate in his ability to cognize the truth. And hence, 
it is no wonder that the judgments of rational observers will in the long 
run converge.
so understood, Christian philosophy is primarily an internal service 
for the Christian community and its intellectual needs. since premises 
from the realm of faith are used, it will be of limited relevance for external 
dialogue, but this is no problem: the task of philosophy is not so much 
to make Christian faith attractive to non-believers, but rather to provide 
an internally attractive vision of it. However, if there are opponents, they 
are of course invited to raise their objections and discuss them with 
Christian philosophers.
IV.2. The ‘Thomistic’ understanding of Christian philosophy follows 
a  different methodology: the philosopher is advised to proceed as far 
as possible with ‘worldview-neutral’ premises (i.e., premises which are 
in principle accessible to anybody), and especially, philosophers must 
not use premises which are only known from revelation. only where 
important questions remain open  – and who would deny that this is 
often the case in philosophy? – may the Thomistic Christian philosopher 
15 so I  take Plantinga’s position in ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’, in Faith and 
Philosophy, 1 (1984), 269f.
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propose answers from Christian doctrine. but he does not do this in 
his competence and authority as a  philosopher; he rather switches to 
a  theological solution when philosophical solutions are not to hand. 
To cash out some rather simple examples, as a proposed answer to the 
question of the ultimate meaning of life, he might refer to the Christian 
doctrine of creation out of God’s love, which bestows any creature its 
immanent value and dignity; or as a possible solution to the problem 
of evil, he might recall that Jesus Christ’s non-violent undergoing of 
violence and death, as well as his resurrection, are hints that evil and 
death are not the final chapters of the world’s story.
Nevertheless, the Thomistic Christian philosopher is a  Christian, 
and as such, he sometimes has certain preferences in his philosophical 
interests: he tends toward philosophical opinions which seem compatible 
with his worldview. but as a philosopher, he would not argue for these 
opinions with premises from faith  – he would pose questions of the 
following type: ‘what good (but worldview-neutral!) arguments could 
lead to conclusions close to Christian doctrines?’ For example, he would 
have a natural interest in the existence of free will, the universality of 
human rights, the existence of God, etc., and look for ways to defend 
them philosophically.
As Franz brentano, Jacques maritain and others put it metaphorically, 
the Christian doctrine is from this viewpoint just a guiding star for the 
philosopher: it tells the philosopher where his reasoning could possibly 
go – just like sailors on the open sea use the guiding star to decide on 
their course.
There is of course a  background assumption behind Thomistic 
Christian Philosophy: The Thomistic Christian philosopher expects that 
there might be apparent, prima facie contradictions between religious 
doctrine (rightly understood) and scientific/philosophical knowledge 
(rightly understood), but that there cannot be an ultimate, unresolvable 
contradiction since God is the source of all truth and has equipped 
us with reason to grasp it. Admittedly, this background assumption is 
theological in nature, but this is unproblematic: it is an assumption that 
is made only by the Christian philosopher himself and does not oblige 
anybody else (it is, so to speak, an assumption made by Christians 
and for Christians). Apparent, prima facie contradictions between 
faith and reason may emerge where methodological and theoretical 
boundaries are overstepped. The debates about creation and evolution 
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provide examples for such cases: wherever theologians try to emendate 
biological theories or biologists feel in a  position to answer questions 
on the ultimate meaning of life, conflicts are to be expected. Hence on 
closer inspection this background assumption has a critical potential in 
various directions. It is not only directed against attempts to extrapolate 
worldview claims from the deliverances of the sciences. The Christian 
philosopher must also be prepared to discover that he or his community 
previously misunderstood, at least in part, their own religious tradition. 
Again, there are historical examples for such (sometimes slow and 
painful) discoveries: Galileo’s case, for example, is an important stage 
on the way toward discovering that the biblical tradition is not meant as 
a scientific account of the structure of the solar system and the universe.16
The tasks of philosophy according to the ‘Thomistic’ approach are to 
show that Christian faith is compatible with up-to-date (and properly 
understood) science and philosophy, and – more than the ‘Augustinian’ 
Christian philosopher would agree  – to make it externally plausible. 
Adapting our graphical model of the structure of belief systems and 
philosophical arguments within them, one might bring out the difference 
as follows:
 
Thomistic pattern of argument
The arrows symbolizing logical support-relations in philosophical 
arguments depart from non-revealed propositions only. The dot touching 
the borderline of the revealed subset symbolizes a proposition which is 
in the vicinity of specifically Christian doctrines (an example could be 
the (philosophical) proposition that human beings have a  particular 
dignity, which is in the vicinity of the (revealed) doctrine that human 
beings are God’s creatures).
16 of course, I  do not want thereby to suggest that ‘Augustinian’ Christian 
philosophers would not likewise be prepared to discover and correct mistakes in their 
own understanding of faith. see on this point, e.g., Alvin Plantinga, ‘on method in 
Christian Philosophy. reply to Keller’, in Faith and Philosophy, 5 (1988), 159-164 
(especially 161f.).
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 Augustinian pattern of argument
on the Augustinian conception, the logical support-relations in philo-
sophical arguments may also depart from revealed propositions, and 
such arguments may support propositions not directly pertaining to 
doctrinal matters.
V. A CoNTemPorArY eXAmPle: AlVIN PlANTINGA 
AND ‘reFormeD ePIsTemoloGY’
Perhaps the most prominent and influential contemporary example of 
an explicitly ‘Augustinian’ conception of Christian philosophy is Alvin 
Plantinga and his project of ‘reformed epistemology’. Presuming that 
a big part of this journal’s readership is familiar with Plantinga’s ideas 
in the philosophy of religion,17 I constrain myself to some facets of his 
thought which are directly pertinent to my present topic. As Plantinga 
repeatedly made clear from the early 1980s onwards,18 he deliberately 
understands and develops his project as a  form of ‘Augustinian 
Christian Philosophy’: ‘It is also perfectly proper to start from what we 
[philosophers, W.l.] know as Christians.’19 The overall project behind 
Plantinga’s philosophizing might be characterized as: ‘make a proposal 
from a Christian perspective, wait for objections, and if they come, try to 
defeat them (i.e., to find ‘defeater defeaters’).’
17 of Plantinga’s numerous books on the topic I  just mention Reason and Belief in 
God (Notre Dame: Notre Dame university Press, 1983) (the key text of early reformed 
epistemology), Warranted Christian Belief (New York: oxford university Press, 2000) 
(Plantinga’s later opus magnum where he elaborates on his position in the current 
epistemological landscape), and recently Where the Conflict Really Lies. Science, Religion, 
& Naturalism (New York: oxford university Press, 2011) (an application to the adjacent 
problem of the relation between religious and scientific claims).
18 see, among others, his articles ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’, in Faith and 
Philosophy, 1 (1984), 253-271; ‘Augustinian Christian Philosophy’, in The Monist, 75 
(1992), 291-320.
19 ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’ (see footnote 18), p. 265.
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‘reformed epistemology’ is an application of this overall strategy to 
current epistemological problems. What would follow for epistemology 
if the Christian doctrines were true? or to put it more concretely: Given 
that we human beings are really created ‘in God’s own image’ (Genesis 
1:27), that we are equipped with a (perhaps brittle and obfuscated) in-
principle ability to cognize God (the Sensus Divinitatis), and that the 
Holy spirit enhances our religious cognition (Plantinga further explicates 
this in his two ‘Aquinas/Calvin models’),20 what would follow for our 
epistemic abilities? – Among others, two consequences might follow.
First, it is plausible that certain people will have (clear or unclear) 
religious experiences, since God wants to communicate with us. 
Plantinga describes the content of such experiences as ‘manifestation 
beliefs’: in certain religiously significant situations (e.g., experiences of 
nature, personal encounter, danger and rescue, but especially the reading 
of the scripture and community service), beliefs like ‘God has created 
all that’, ‘God speaks to me now’, or ‘God should be praised’ might 
emerge in us, and they might well be epistemologically respectable. 
Hence, projection theories à la Freud, marx, etc., are wrong: of course, 
the Christian will admit that some questionable or even insane religious 
manifestation beliefs occur, but from the Christian viewpoint not every 
single case of religious manifestation beliefs is just a case of projection, 
illusion, wishful thinking, group-dynamical fascination, etc. If critics in 
the Freud /marx vein would like to justify their ‘exceptionless projection’ 
claim, they would have to bear the burden of a proof of the tout court 
20 A question that I can merely mention here concerns the theological adequacy of 
these premises: old Testament scholars are usually reluctant to ascribe to the ‘tzelem 
elohim / image of God’ of Genesis 1:27 any epistemological implications. The same holds 
for the ‘imago Dei’ and related passages in the old and New Testaments; they rather say 
something about the human being’s dignity and vocation and not about our epistemic 
abilities. only in medieval scholastic theological anthropology did some authors begin to 
explore the possible epistemological consequences of the ‘imago Dei’ doctrine. likewise, 
there is doubt whether a Sensus Divinitatis (the central notion of the Aquinas/Calvin 
model) was taught by Aquinas or Calvin: Aquinas mentions such a natural cognition of 
God as a counterargument to his own position (s.Th. I, 2, 1, obi.1) and sees it as an at 
most vague, confused and unreliable ability (s.Th. I, 2, 1, ad 1). As the reformed German 
theologian Georg Plasger, one of the leading Calvin scholars of our times, has recently 
shown, Calvin did not in fact consider a Sensus Divinitatis as a significant theological 
factor, either in the Institutes (where it appears only peripherally) or elsewhere (‘Did 
Calvin teach a Sensus Divinitatis?’, forthcoming). – All that, if correct, would of course 
not preclude the legitimacy of Plantinga’s theological premises. It would just imply that 
it is not standard theology what is called for here, but essentially his peculiar reading of it.
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falsity of theism and Christianity. The Christian may lean back and wait 
for this proof.
secondly, the ‘Augustinian’ Christian thinker will have a preference 
for epistemological realism: it is much more plausible that we can 
really find out truths about our world and not just evolutionary useful, 
survival-efficient beliefs, as naturalism says. The reason for this is that 
the omniscient God cognizes truths, and we humans are created ‘in 
his image’, i.e., we share his epistemic abilities to a certain extent. (one 
facet of this God-similar ability is the convergence of our probability 
judgments in the light of new evidence, mentioned in section IV.1.)
Plantinga openly admits that the ultimate question whether the 
Aquinas/Calvin models are true (i.e., whether the Christian doctrines 
about creation, the Sensus Divinitatis and the Holy spirit are true and 
theistic Christian beliefs are thus warranted) must remain open, at least 
from a philosophical standpoint. The book title Warranted Christian Belief 
may suggest a bit more here; what Plantinga in fact offers is just a partial 
answer to this question by providing counter-arguments to six prominent 
lines of attack to Christian faith. but Plantinga does not overstep the 
result gained by the early 1980s reformed epistemology, which is that 
it is possible for Christian belief to be epistemologically legitimate. The 
main new achievement of more recent reformed epistemology is the 
design of a (Christian) model explaining this possible legitimacy.
It might also be interesting to ask how Plantinga’s actual philosophical 
practice squares with his official Augustinianism. And here it might be 
noted that many of his arguments outside the central tenets of reformed 
epistemology are in fact more ‘Thomistic’ than ‘Augustinian’ in nature. 
For example, most of his defeater-defeaters to anti-religious arguments 
in Warranted Christian Belief refer to internal inconsistencies, general 
implausibilities, etc., in these arguments without invoking any 
theological premises. (I leave it as an issue for further reflection whether 
finding a  defeater-defeater for a  proposition p must necessarily avoid 
circularity by not using p among the premises. Hence, the very project 
of defeater-defeater for Christian faith is perhaps necessarily ‘Thomistic’ 
in its argumentative structure.) Plantinga’s much-discussed evolutionary 
argument against naturalism21 is further evidence in that direction. 
21 J. beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument 
Against Evil (Ithaca: Cornell university Press, 2002), and Alvin Plantinga, Where the 
Conflict Really Lies (see footnote 17 above).
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Plantinga tries to show that naturalism is internally self-undermining – 
and this is a Thomistic form of argument. It does not rely on theological 
premises, it supports the Christian viewpoint only indirectly, by 
eliminating a rival position. And as a third indication one might collect 
the many passages across Plantinga’s works where (traditional as well as 
new) theistic arguments receive a very positive value, even if they are not 
seen as necessary for the rationality of faith.22
VI. FINAl reFleCTIoN: WHY ‘THomIsTIC’ 
CHrIsTIAN PHIlosoPHY seems PreFerAble
observations like those just mentioned may invite consideration of 
whether a ‘Thomistic’ standpoint in philosophy has in sum perhaps more 
to recommend it. In the following final reflections, I want to substantiate 
this presumption. I  do this using Plantinga’s ‘Augustinian’ position as 
a contrast, but I should begin with two disclaimers: first, I do not intend 
a critical analysis of Plantinga’s position (which would be quite an odd 
task to attempt in a  few lines), and second, I am aware that the issues 
in question are connected with very fundamental claims concerning 
the task of philosophy, etc., for which knock-down arguments in any 
direction are not to be expected. Hence, my remarks do not claim to be 
more than reasoned declarations of a philosophical preference.
First and very generally, by its very idea philosophy does not address 
only a certain community, be it a cultural, linguistic, religious, or another 
community (see section I). Giving, taking, and critically analyzing 
philosophical reasons are activities that surpass the borders of intellectual 
communities: they involve stepping back from one’s own habitual way 
of thinking, taking an impartial standpoint (as far as possible), and 
considering reasons from that perspective. of course, philosophers (like 
all people) are entitled to have an opinion on worldview-related issues, 
and they will be more prepared to give reasons for them than other 
people will be. but it is only of limited advantage if these reasons are 
based on sources which many of their dialogue partners will not accept 
from the outset.
one could, of course, recall a useful distinction between personal and 
interpersonal arguments:23 interpersonal arguments rest only on premises 
22 see, e.g., ‘Augustinian Christian Philosophy’ (see footnote 18), p. 294.
23 see otto muck, Rationalität und Weltanschauung (Innsbruck – Wien: Tyrolia, 1999), 
pp. 113f.
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which are expected to be mutually acceptable, whereas personal arguments 
may also draw from some premises which are not. Personal arguments 
are by no means idle: they make an interlocutor’s thinking and acting 
understandable and by that help avoid unnecessary misunderstandings 
and other irritations. In that sense, one might describe ‘Augustinian’ 
Christian philosophy as making more liberal use of personal (Christian) 
argumentation than the ‘Thomistic’ Christian philosopher. Nevertheless, 
the fertility of personal arguments in philosophical dialogue is obviously 
limited. It is hence not by chance when Plantinga himself switches to 
rather ‘Thomistic’ and more interpersonal forms of argument in his 
attempts to defeat forms of anti-religious thought.
secondly, ‘Augustinian’ Christian philosophy must at certain points 
make use of theological concepts and hence inherits the hermeneutical 
problems of theology. The problem here is not only that not every 
philosopher is knowledgeable and competent in theology; a  deeper 
problem lurks in the different ways of understanding theological 
concepts within theology itself. Philosophers invoking theological 
concepts may produce positions which are as interesting and acceptable 
as their chosen background theologies are. And there is a certain danger 
of producing views which are acceptable neither for most philosophers 
nor even for a bigger percentage of the theological audience. Plantinga’s 
reformed epistemology provides an example: It may at first glance seem 
convincing to reconstruct manifestation beliefs formed from religious 
experience as being similar to beliefs formed on the basis of perception 
and memory; nevertheless this presupposes a certain understanding of 
God, creation, the ways of communication between man and God, such 
as the Sensus Divinitatis, etc. The aforementioned theological discussions 
(see footnote 20) about the Sensus Divinitatis and Plantinga’s particular 
understanding of it may serve as a warning against importing parochial 
theological views into the philosophical discourse.
Third, one might reverse my first argument and look at it from 
a theological point of view. From that perspective it seems questionable 
to what extent an ‘Augustinian’ Christian philosophy would really 
be helpful for Christians who have doubts about their faith. Would 
primarily internal ‘defeater-defeaters’ against attacks from outside be 
sufficient, in the face of more than 300 years of religious criticism and 
against the backdrop of a religiously pluralist society? or should there 
be more attention to external justifications, as ‘Thomistic’ Christian 
philosophy emphasizes? Again, it is interesting to observe that Plantinga’s 
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defeater-defeaters are in many cases rather ‘Thomistic’ in their overall 
pattern.
I conclude that there is no in-principle obstacle to the use of ‘Christian 
Philosophy’ as a label for philosophical positions. In light of the above 
considerations, it might even be a matter of transparency and sincerity 
to lay bare any possible influences from the worldview within which 
one operates. However, all in all the ‘Thomistic’ self-understanding 
of ‘philosophizing Christians’ (even when they are conscious of 
their possible worldview-driven preferences) seems to have more to 
recommend it, whereas an ‘Augustinian Christian philosophy’ seems 
to be inherently subject to the dangers of parochialism and of blending 
philosophy and theology in a questionable way.24
24 This paper was originally presented in berlin, at a  workshop ‘reasoning from 
different religious perspectives’ (14-15 march 2013) for the Analytic Theology Project, 
which was generously funded by the John Templeton Foundation. I am indebted to the 
participants of this workshop for their feedback and especially to Katherine Dormandy 
(née munn) for her linguistic assistance and numerous helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this paper.
